The next and decisive question on the appeal is whether, as appellants argue, the Legislature intended Section 12756 to apply retrospectively. Had Fountain suffered his ‘conviction’ after the effective date of the statute, there would be no doubt of the Board’s authority to revoke his credential by summary action, for it was held Di Genova v. State Board of Education, that the statute does not require either formal notice, charges or a hearing. The Di Genova case did not, however, decide whether the statute was retroactive. The opinion states that the only question involved was the revocation of the plaintiff’s credentials without charges, notice or hearing.
It is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent. The Penal Code states that: ‘No part of it is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.’ Identical provisions are to be found in the Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, and there can be no doubt that such is the policy of the law. As the Supreme Court said Krause v. Rarity: ‘although the Legislature has the power to give a statute retrospective operation, if it does not impair the obligations of contracts or disturb vested rights, yet it is to be presumed that no statute is intended to have that effect, and it will not be given that effect, unless such intention clearly appear from the language of the statute.’ We find nothing in the Education Code which would compel, much less justify, a conclusion that that statute was intended to apply retrospectively.
Supreme Court Decides Public Transportation Case
