By numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States this act of Congress has been applied to cases practically like the one at bar. It is true that most of them relate to carriage of property, hence learned counsel for respondent argue that they are not applicable. But the law governs the transportation of persons as well as property. No agent of any road subject to the provisions of the act, has any authority to make or recognize any arrangement for transportation of persons or property from a point in one state to another for other than the legal rate.
Charging one person more or less than another is not lawful. See among other cases Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Mottley and Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Kirby. The decision in the latter case is particularly in point here, the shipper claiming that he was entitled to a special routing of certain horses that would insure quicker transportation from the point of shipment to point of destination than if going by the regular route. Mr. Justice Lurton, delivering the opinion of the court, said that the broad purpose of the commerce act was to compel the establishment of reasonable rates and their uniform application. That purpose would be defeated if sanction be given to a special contract by which any such advantage is given to a particular shipper as that contracted for by the defendant in error. To guarantee a particular connection and transportation by a particular train, was to give an advantage or preference not open to all and not provided for in the published tariffs.
This same view of the law has been recognized in many decisions of our Supreme Court and of this court, as Dunne & Grace v. St. Louis & Southwestern Ry. Co. It follows that whatever arrangement plaintiff may have had here with the ticket agent, he had no right to be transported over the longer route at the tariff rate applicable to the shorter. If he traveled by the longer, he could not do so without paying fare applicable to that route and at the time chargeable to all persons traveling by that route, and if he attempted to do so the conductor had not only the right but it was his duty to refuse to carry him.
